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CULTURE AND THE AGE OF ENLIGHTENMENT 
by Virgil W. Topazio 
Freud once remarked that the first requisite of civilization is justice; it is less 
debatable to contend that culture represents the corpus of human standards 
summarized as civilization. In our discussion of culture, we shall understand- 
ably be concerned with the humanistic as well as the socioIogica1 and an- 
thropological concepts, i.e., the comprehensive esthetic, ethical, and literary 
considerations combined with the set of values more traditionally representing 
the sum of man's institutions and mores. 
Admittedly, even savage tribes have their own particular culture and justice, 
but the more sophisticated eighteenth-century French society required an ad- 
vanced system of justice more like the one propounded by the eminent 
eighteenth-century Italian philosopher and criminologist, Cesar Beccaria, in his 
1764 Treatise on Crimes and P~nishments.~ The efficacy of any system of 
justice, however, depends upon the degree of individuaI and social conformity 
to established norms of behavior that distinguish between right and wrong, a 
distinction determined by reason and experience. 
The eighteenth century, with its definite shift in emphasis from the divine to 
the secular, marked a point in the history of cultures when man for the first 
time became fully cognizant of his potential to effect a better life through 
human intercession. Thanks to the determined efforts of a relatively small 
group of dedicated philosophes, of whom the most persistent and effective was 
unquestionably Voltaire, that elusive vision had become not only attainable, 
but more imperative in view of the growing belief that a new humanism 
should supplant the previous reliance upon religious guidance and control in 
every sphere of human endeavor. The new humanism placed its faith in man's 
ability and right to exercise his own judgment in the choice and evaluation of 
his behavior. 
The importance of the eighteenth-century French philosophes, then, was to 
shift the emphasis from the religious culture that had thoroughly dominated 
the Middle Ages and had remained powerfully pervasive throughout the seven- 
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teenth century, to a secular culture in which the proper study of man became 
man himself, as Alexander Pope eIoquently pointed out in his 1733  Essay on 
Man. Almost a millennium before, the great Latin poet, Terence, had aptly 
summarized the position of the philosophes with these words: Homo sum: 
humani nil a me alienum puto, How well they succeeded was summed up by 
Sebastien Mercier with these words: "If despotism has become civilized, if the 
sovereigns have begun to fear the voice of the nations, to respect that supreme 
tribunal, it is to the writer's pen that we owe this new and hitherto unknown 
restraint. "2 
The creative energies of man, liberated by the forces at work during the 
Renaissance, had forged the basis of a new culture that revised drastically the 
goals of civilization and the concept of man's destiny on earth. The Enlighten- 
ment, the name given this era by IrnmanueI Kant, held forth one vision-a 
more fulfilling and rewarding life, an  essential cornerstone of which had to be 
freedom. T o  achieve this, society was held up as the appropriate idol for man, 
and within it each citizen became a lay priest. The philosophes turned to 
reason and experience to furnish the facts needed to destroy the prejudices 
responsible for the intolerance and injustice that had denied man a better life. 
By the second half of the eighteenth century, enough progress had been made 
to compel most ruling princes to  realize that "some degree of literary 
sophistication, philosophical skepticism, and political liberalism was a sine qua 
non of elegance in Europe's capitals" and to strive consciously "to be seen as 
modern, enlightened, and civilized. " 3  
It should be pointed out that the philosophes, with the possible exception of 
the abbk Condillac, were not systematic philosophers seeking to establish new 
philosophical doctrines. They were moral thinkers intent on preserving human 
dignity and human rights. Condillac, in his Trait6 des sensations of 1749, 
did refine and develop the sensationalist theories of John Locke's A n  Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding published in 1690. These two works 
became indispensable tools in undermining the hold exercised by the Church 
and State over the minds and bodies of the people. Once one accepted the 
Lockean theory that only that which could be verified by the senses deserved 
credibility, dogmas, revelation, and miracles lost their authority, as did the 
king himself, who had previously been sheltered by his quasi-divine status. In 
short, no  truth henceforth retained its validity unless it could withstand the 
scrutiny of reason and scientific examination. 
The list of philosophes who contributed to the Enlightenment is long indeed. 
For the purposes of this paper, we shall restrict ourselves to the four un- 
disputed French literary giants of the eighteenth century: Montesquieu, 
Voltaire, Diderot, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (however ironic or contradictory 
it may seem to include Rousseau among the philosophes in view of his 
unrelenting attacks upon everything the Enlightenment represented: a belief in 
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progress, education, the arts, science, and literature-the very hallmarks of 
civilization). 
Though by comparison with the seventeenth, the eighteenth century ex- 
perienced a much greater influence from abroad, especially from England and 
Germany, the French language and culture still dominated the western world. 
For example, Frederick I1 of Prussia preferred to speak French, and fancying 
himself a poet, he wrote poetry in French and sent it to Voltaire, widely ac- 
cepted as the greatest living poet, for his criticism and evaluation. Catherine I1 
of Russia not only appreciated the cultural superiority of France, she commis- 
sioned a "Plan for a University for the Government of Russia" from Diderot, 
whose library she had previously purchased. Later she bought the library and 
papers of Voltaire as well, and over a span of many years the Empress 
systematically acquired many French works of art that are now to be found in 
the famous Leningrad Collection. 
In France one witnessed an insatiable desire for knowledge, not only on the 
part of the philosophes, who assumed that every field of knowledge and inquiry 
fell within their legitimate purview, but also among the salon habitues for 
whom dabbling in the sciences, belles lettres, and the arts helped to make one 
socially acceptable. (Parenthetically, I should add that the role of the women 
who ruled over the salons was particularly important. They often decided, for 
example, who would be elected to the French Academy as well as who would 
receive many other honors and positions.) This dillettantism, widespread also 
in England among the so-called bluestockings of whom there were many in 
London, was especially evident in the natural and life sciences. Even Louis 
XIV and Mme de Pompadour spent hours over their microscopes. This sort of 
affectation or obsession was sometimes carried to its extreme, as in the case of 
Mlle de Coigny, who reputedly kept a corpse in her coach so that she could 
pursue the fascinating study of anatomy during her long trips. Rousseau 
himself, in spite of his diatribes against the evils of culture, carried on ex- 
periments, and in fact once almost blinded himself while experimenting with 
ink. 
Notwithstanding these examples of frivolous scientific curiosity, the sciences 
had long since become the subject of serious study, as evidenced in the 
previous century by the founding in 1660 of the Royal Society in England and 
in 1666 the Academie des Sciences in France. And in eighteenth-century 
France, keen interest in the sciences was manifest in the avocation, if not voca- 
tion, of many of its most distinguished writers. For example, Montesquieu, 
universally recognized as the greatest political thinker of the century, early in 
his career was immersed in the sciences and wrote on scientific subjects. 
Voltaire's interest in the sciences was unquestionably influenced by his 
mistress, Emilie du Chitelet. They set up an elaborate laboratory at Cirey, 
her chiteau, where Voltaire spent almost sixteen years, during which time 
her husband was conveniently occupied elsewhere with either Venus or Mars. 
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Diderot's interest was revealed by his frequent attendance at the Sorbonne lec- 
tures on biology and chemistry, and also by his insistence on having his 
daughter, Angklique, attend anatomy classes, a most daring action for that 
time. The Baron d'Holbach should be mentioned in this regard because of his 
more than three hundred articles on scientific subjects that appeared in the En- 
cyclopidie. And then, of course, there were the really serious researchers like 
Buffon, whose thirty-six volume Histoire naturelle was a veritable encyclopedia 
of sciences, Rouelle, a famous chemist, and Lavoisier, an even greater chemist, 
who is universally recognized as one of the creators of modern chemistry. 
The stability of the seventeenth century, symbolized by a classical 
philosophy in literature, arts, and the autocratic political rule of Louis XIV, 
gave way in the eighteenth century to an intellectual and social ferment that 
characterized the Enlightenment as a turning point in our cultural history. 
The shift from mathematical sciences to natural and life sciences, and the 
adoption of a new method of inquiry, had resulted in the abandonment of in- 
nate, a priori, and deductive or rationalistic ideas and theories in favor of a new 
approach dictated by the Baconian inductive system that relied heavily on 
observation and experiment. Briefly, the incalculable contribution by 
eighteenth-century thinkers to the new culture and new humanism was boldly 
to extend the dominion of the scientific and empirical method of inquiry to in- 
clude metaphysics, religion, and therefore ethics-in short, every field of 
human endeavor. 
What transpired was a crisis of major proportions. Turbulence and confusion 
resulted, in part because of the unresolved controversy over whether humans 
alone possessed a moral sense of good and evil, in accordance with the 
seventeenth-century Cartesian dichotomy that distinguished between human 
and animal, body and soul. These deliberations increased the ever-widening 
chasm being created between man and God. And as the restraints and 
guidance previously supplied by religious, poIitical, and metaphysical controIs 
diminished, disorders and uncertainties increased within a society oriented 
toward man. In literature and art, the philosophical reintegration of man 
within the all-embracing fold of nature eventually led to a greater emphasis 
upon the individual with its concomitant defense, if not approval, of human 
emotions and passions. This is sometimes referred to in the eighteenth century 
as the rehabilitation of the passions, in opposition to the seventeenth-century 
view forcefully epitomized by Pascal's life-style, which included self-flagellation 
to punish the sinful flesh. 
A new ethic was needed for the cultural climate being created by the 
philosophes. The goal of the Enlightenment, as expressed by the Baron 
d'Holbach in his SystBrne social of 1773, was "to make people happy 
through virtue" (III, 164). The dilemma confronting the philosophes, 
however, was how to persuade the people to subordinate their self interest to 
the general interest; or as Rousseau posed this fundamental problem in his 
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Contrat social, how "each uniting with all will nevertheless obey only 
h im~elf ."~  The general acceptance that culture, like virtue, can have meaning 
only within a social context, was the rationale for the eighteenth century's em- 
phasis on bienfaisance (or emphasis on good deeds) as opposed to the 
seventeenth-century reliance upon biensiance (or emphasis on propriety and 
decorum). 
In the formulation of the new social order and ethics that came to represent 
the Enlightenment, Montesquieu's De /'Esprit des lois of 1748 and 
Rousseau's Du contrat social of 1762 were very influential, especially in 
guiding the leaders of the French Revolution to proclaim the "D6claration 
des Droits de I'Homme." Americans should remember that our Founding 
Fathers were profoundly influenced by these two works-more precisely by 
Montesquieu's practical insistence upon a separation of powers and his system 
of checks and balances, and by Rousseau's idealistic, if not always realistic, in- 
sistence upon the preservation of the individual's dignity and rights within the 
necessarily inevitable social and governmental structure. 
The genius of Montesquieu was to work order out of the chaos of existing 
laws and different forms of government and to write his magnum opus in a 
clear and succinct style. H e  was one of the first to understand that social 
phenomena are subjected to two kinds of forces, physical and moral; and thus, 
in the opinion of many critics, he was proclaimed a precursor of modern 
sociology, which actually did not emerge as a discipline until the first half of 
the nineteenth century with Auguste Comte. Montesquieu's De L'Esprit des 
Lois was the culmination of a lifetime of study and research, the completion of 
which was a race against total blindness. What emerged from this work was 
the recognition that legislation in general was not an abstract science but was 
bound to a great number of factors-historical, geographic, economic, and 
moral. As  he explained in his Preface, "My principles are not drawn from my 
prejudices, rather they derive from the very nature of things."' This working 
principle enabled Montesquieu to reduce the complexity of laws to a more 
comprehensible and workable system stressing the relativity of laws. 
In De /'Esprit des Lois as well as in his Lettres persanes of 1721, Monres- 
quieu, conservative nobleman and orthodox Catholic though he was, earned 
his credentials as a philosophe and humanist, for both works in different ways 
took up the cudgels against all the abuses of the day: religious intolerance, in- 
justice, slavery, and despotism. T o  be sure, unlike Voltaire's, Montesquieu's 
temperament and background generally managed to keep him, like a 
Pirandellian mouthpiece character, cynically looking down from his detached 
or Olympian perch upon the human comedy or tragedy below. Anti- 
Voltaireans might judge Montesquieu's condemnations and attacks more ef- 
ficacious, because they were invariably accompanied by reasonable remedies 
more likely to be accepted by both his fellow philosophes and the institutions 
under attack. Briefly, Montesquieu seemed to offer a social system that avoided 
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the Scylla of supernatural authoritarianism or anarchy and the Charybdis of a 
pn'ori rationalism or adherence to reason unsupported by scientific examina- 
tion. The deification of Reason during the Revolution was a tragic example of 
the dangers inherent in overemphasizing a virtue; the intransigent Robespierre, 
Danton, and Marat, alas, had not paid sufficient heed to the "Maxim" of La 
RochefoucauId, in which he warned that virtue itself when pushed too far 
became a vice. 
Whereas Montesquieu's De /'Esprit des lois was a work based on much 
precise research, Rousseau's Contrat social was an abstract political construct, 
a purely theoretical work. Nonetheless, it indicated a new direction toward a 
more human existence, in his attempt to blend the people and the government 
into one. There is no doubt that Rousseau's impassioned rhetoric and slogan- 
like statements, like "Man was born free and is everywhere in  chain^,"^ had a 
greater impact on the revolutionaries than the more judicial presentation of 
Montesquieu, whom Rousseau by the way admired greatly. Perhaps the basic 
difference between their approaches is that for Montesquieu laws preceded liber- 
ty, that is, the liberty of the governed depended upon the particular formula- 
tion of laws, whereas for Rousseau liberty preceded laws. In Rousseau's eyes 
the General Will or Volontd Generale, which represents the expression of 
society's collective will as reflected through its legislation and constitution, 
could have meaning only if that General Will presupposed and accepted as in- 
violate the liberty of the individuals who made up the social unit. 
In his Contrat social, Rousseau was subconsciously coming to grips with one 
of the fundamental dilemmas underlying eighteenthcentury philosophical and 
ethical speculation. Nature and reason being the guideposts of eighteenth- 
century thought, their relationship to ethics and culture constituted one of the 
crucial problems. Nature or 'natural' was interpreted as that which existed 
prior to the development of reason, art, culture, and civilization. Natural man 
and Natural Law postulated a universal, physiological oneness or essence of 
man as opposed to the more ephemeral and artificial customs and positive laws 
spawned by civilization. More convinced than the philosophes that everything 
was good when it left the hands of God, Rousseau vehemently condemned 
society, culture, and their by-products such as literature, the arts, and the 
theatre for having 'denatured' man. Rousseau also condemned the 
philosophes ' rehabilitation of the passions for having needlessly multiplied 
harmful desires and passions that had conspired to destroy the simple goodness 
of natural man. 
Completely disillusioned by what society and culture had produced, 
Rousseau undertook, in his three major non-autobiographical works (Emile, la 
Nouvelle Heloise, and the Contrat social), to present his idea1 constructs of an 
individual, family, and society. And recognizing the inevitable march of society 
and the impossibility of returning to a happier and simpler way of l ie,  he  at- 
tempted in the Contrat social to establish a form of government that would 
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best preserve most of the human rights originally enjoyed by his natural man. 
Like all the philosophes, Voltaire sought to reconcile his unswerving faith in 
society's capacity to further man's welfare with his concern to protect the in- 
dividual from having his identity as a human being engulfed by that very soci- 
ety. The best long-term resolution of this dilemma in the opinion of our four 
philosophes was to be found in the development of an enlightened monarch. 
But in the meantime there were many problems that needed immediate atten- 
tion, s o  Voltaire took the lead in battling the forces of evil, and he remained 
more "engage" throughout his long lifetime than any otherphilosophe. Next 
to Rousseau's heretical attacks on culture and civilization, what Voltaire con- 
demned most about Rousseau was precisely his lack of commitment to the 
philosophic cause. And his consternation and anger were understandable. 
Voltaire himself exemplified culture and classical erudition, and like Bertrand 
Russell, his twentieth-century disciple, would have preferred civilization had it 
become necessary to choose between it and democracy. 
Such was Voltaire's fame as a poet and dramatist, that in the eyes of many 
contemporaries he rivaled Corneille and Racine. Nor should one overlook his 
important contribution to the development of modem historiography and the 
new prose genre he virtually created, of which the immortal Candide is the 
finest example. In his humanitarian battles he spared neither his precious time 
and resources nor his friends. It became his custom to end his innumerable let- 
ters (of which we at present have 21,221) with his familiar battle slogan, 
"Ecrasez l7inf2me." He  was so concerned with eradicating the eviIs in soci- 
ety that many critics unjustly proclaimed him the very Vitruvius of ruin. But 
Voltaire knew all too well that injustice, intolerance, and prejudice had to be 
eliminated before one could build anything new. 
In any discussion of culture in the eighteenth century, the name of Diderot 
must be added to those of Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Rousseau. It was 
Diderot who masterminded the publication of the most important single under- 
taking of the century, the Encyclopddie, of which the seventeen volumes of 
text and five volumes of plates were published between 1751 and 1765. 
Diderot's persistence prevailed in bringing this work to its conclusion in spite 
of seemingly insurmountable obstacles like the defection of his co-editor 
D'Alembert in 1758 and a continual battle with censorship that eventually led 
to the suppression of the Encyclopddie by the Government in 1759. Never- 
theless, Voltaire complained that concessions to censorship had deprived the 
work of its desired effectiveness and that the uneven quality of the numerous 
contributors had produced a work stylistically defective. These dissatisfactions 
n o  doubt made him more susceptible to the suggestion made to a dimer group 
by Frederick I1 one evening at  Potsdam to undertake a philosophical dic- 
tionary. Frederick I1 may not have been serious In making his suggestion, but 
Voltaire reportedly seized upon the idea and proceeded to embark upon this 
project with his customary zeal. A s  a result, by 1764 he had singlehandedly 
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compiled his own Dictionnaire philosophique. And about a decade later, bet- 
ween 1772 and 1774, he had expanded this alphabetical format into the nine- 
volume Questions sur I'Encyclope'die. 
Impressive as the alphabetical works of Voltaire are, and some consider his 
Dictionnaire philosophique one of his greatest works, Diderot's Encyclopedic 
remains a more comprehensive reflection of the total culture and thought of 
the eighteenth century, if for no other reason than that it does represent the views 
of 178 contributors carefully selected by Diderot and D'Alembert for their 
particular expertise. It is a veritable compendium of knowledge, as well as a 
repository of philosophical thought and propaganda, the omnipresent cen- 
sorship notwithstanding. However, an  accurate assessment of Diderot's 
cultural contributions must also include the broad humanism revealed in his 
quasi-philosophical novels, plays, treatises, and the art criticism of his nine 
Salons, on the basis of which some critics mistakenly consider Diderot the 
forerunner of modern art criticism. Immeasurably influenced by the Earl of 
Shaftesbury's Inquiry Concerning Virtue and Merit, which he translated quite 
freely in 1745, Diderot possessed an optimistic view of human nature and a 
belief in human progress that were only slightly altered by the more realistic 
appraisal of man he adopted in later years. 
When man constructs a world of culture, invariably its meaning derives 
from or depends upon values that are both natural and moral, objective and 
subjective, empirical and rational. Those values, perceived during the 
Enlightenment in terms of a nature-reason or nature-culture antithesis, 
presented a dilemma incapable of utopian solution. Lester Crocker posed the 
problem thus: ' LIf Nature is good and culture is responsible for vice and crime, 
then shall we ask culture to repress nature? If man is evil by nature, shall we 
look for natural remedies?"' That the philosophes sensed this ambivalence is 
manifest from the strong current of primitivism that pervades their works. On 
the whole, however, liberal philosophes like Montesquieu, Voltaire, and 
Diderot acknowledged the conflicts and unhappiness resulting from the tragic 
antinomies in human experience as an inevitable part of the human condition. 
They remained convinced, nonetheless, that the individual working within the 
social framework should continue to strive to effect those solutions most 
beneficial to society as a whole, while striving to preserve as much as possible 
the individual's rights and liberty. The role of the philosophes was that of the 
traditionaI humanists, i.e,, to provide perspective, criticism, and clarification to 
human behavior, and thereby give meaning to human life. 
Two centuries later, it is clear that the same social-political and nature- 
culture dilemmas continue to plague mankind. The failure on the part of soci- 
ety to resolve those dilemmas indirectly supports the position of the advocates 
of the Ancients in the iamous controversy between the Ancients and the 
Moderns in the seventeenth century. They were ready to concede to the 
Moderns that the undeniable scientific and technological advances had 
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simplified if not resolved many problems, but in the realm of ethics and culture 
the Ancients argued improvement or progress was far less demonstrable, In- 
deed, they maintained, a good case could be made for the superiority of the 
Ancients. Though the respective positions of the Ancients and Moderns may 
be debatable, one fact appears to be irrefutable: the eighteenth century in 
general, with the French philosophes as its vanguard, provided the social and 
political impetus that was destined to alter the course of culture in western 
civilization. 
Only time will tell, of course, whether the twentieth century will have suc- 
ceeded in bringing to fruition the dreams and goals of those eighteenth-century 
French philasophes who pragmatically combined idealism and realism in their 
campaign to establish a cultural atmosphere more conducive to man's welfare. 
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